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Abstract. The concept of ring signature was introduced by Rivest,
Shamir and Tauman. This signature is considered to be a simplified
group signature from which identity of signer is ambiguous although
verifier knows the group to which signer belong. In this paper we intro-
duce a new proxy ring signature scheme.1
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1 Introduction
Consider the following situation discussed by Zhang et al. in [10]-
An entity delegate his signing capability to many proxies, called
proxy signers set. Any proxy signer can perform the signing oper-
ation of the original entity. These proxy signers want to sign mes-
sages on behalf of the original entity while providing anonymity.
Of course, this problem can be solved by group signature (Take the
group manager as the original entity). But in some applications, it
is necessary to protect the privacy of participants (we believe that
unconditional anonymity is necessary in many occasions). If the
proxies don’t hope that some one (include the original signer) can
open their identities, the group signature is not suitable in here
(Because a group manager can open the signature to reveal the
identity of the signer).
To solve above problem proxy ring signature scheme was introduced by
Zhang et al [10]. In this paper, we propose a new proxy ring signature
1 This paper appeared at the conference ’RMS 2004’, Agra, INDIA
scheme based on Lin-Wu’s [9] ID-based ring signature scheme from bi-
linear pairing. As compared to previous scheme [10], our scheme is com-
putationally more efficient, especially for the pairing operations required
during signature verification.
2 Preliminaries
– Bilinear Pairings
LetG1 cyclic additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q,
and G2 bea cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q: A bilinear
pairing is a map e : G1 ×G1 −→ G2 with the following properties:
P1: Bilinear : e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab;
P2: Non-degenerate: There exists P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1;
P3: Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q)
for all P,Q ∈ G1.
When the DDHP (Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem) is easy but the
CDHP (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) is hard on the group
G; we call G a Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) group. Such groups can
be found on supersingular elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves over
finite field, and the bilinear parings can be derived from the Weil or
Tate pairing. We can refer to [7,10] for more details.
Through this paper, we define the system parameters in all schemes
are as follows: Let P be a generator ofG1; the bilinear pairing is given
by e : G1 × G1 −→ G2. Define two cryptographic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}
∗ −→ zq and H2 : {0, 1}
∗ −→ G2.
– Paring based short signature scheme (PBSSS) Boneh et al.’s
pairing based short signature scheme is as follows-
Key Generation Choose a random number s ∈ Z∗q and compute
PPub = sP where (G1, G2, q, P, PPub,H2) are public parameter and s
is the secret key.
Signing For a message m ∈ 0, 1∗, compute Pm = H2(m) ∈ G1,. Then
Sm = sPm is the signature on message m.
Verification Check whether the following equation holds
e(Sm, P ) = e(H2(m), PPub)
This scheme is proven to be secure against existential forgery on adap-
tive chosen message attack (in random oracle model) assuming Com-
putationally Diffie Hellman Problem is hard [8].
3 Proposed Scheme
[Setup] The system parameters params = {G1,G2, e, q, P,H1,H2} Let
Alice be the original signer with public key PKo = soP and private key so,
and L = {PSi} be the set of proxy signers with public key PKpi = spiP
and private key spi.
[Proxy Key Generation] The original signer prepares a warrant w,
which is explicit description of the delegation relation. Then he sends
(w, soH2(w)) to the proxy group L. Each proxy signer uses his secret key
Spi to sign the warrant w and gets his proxy key Si = soH2(w)+spiH2(w).
[Proxy Ring Signing]For signing any message m, the proxy signer PSi
chooses a subset L′ ⊆ L. Proxy signers’s public key is listed in L′. Now
to sign he/ she perform following operations:
– Initialization: Choose randomly an element A ∈ G1, compute
ck+1 = e(A,P ) (1)
– Generate forward ring sequence For i = k + 1, k + 2, ....k + (n − 1)
choose randomly Ti ∈ G1 and compute
ci+1 = e(PKo + PKpi , ciH2(w))
H2(m‖L).e(T i, P ) (2)
– Forming the ring: Let Rn = Ro. Then, PSi computes
Ti = A− h2(m ‖ L)ciSi, (3)
T = Σni=1Ti (4)
– Output: Finally, Let cn = c0. The resulting ring signature for a
message m and with ring member specified by L′ is the (n + 1)-
tuple:(c1, c2, ..., cn, T )
[Verification] Given message m, its ring signature (c1, c2, ..., cn, T ), and
the set L′ of the identities of all ring members, the verifier can check the
validity of the signature by the testing if:
Πni=1ci = e(PKo + PKpi , Σ
n
i=1ciH1(w))
H2(m‖L).e(T, P ) (5)
4 Performance and Security Discussion
Key Secrecy In computing user Pi’s private key Si from the correspond-
ing public key PKo + PKPi requires the knowledge of original signer’s
private key so and proxy signer’s private key spi. According to defini-
tion these keys are protected under the intractability of DLP in G1 as
PKo = soP and PKPi = spiP .
Signer ambiguity In a valid proxy ring signature (c1, c2, ..., cn, T ) with
proxy group L′ generated by PSi all ci’s are computed by eq 2. Since
Ti ∈ G1 is chosen uniformly at random, each ci is uniformly distributed
over G2. Thus, regardless who the actual signer is and how many ring
members involved (c1, c2, ..., cn) biases to no specific ring member.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a new proxy ring signature which becomes
needful whenever proxy signer want to sign message on behalf of the orig-
inal signer providing anonymity. The proposed scheme is more efficient
as compared with the Zhang et al.’s, especially for the pairing operation
required in the signature verification. This proxy ring signature scheme
is more efficient for those verifiers who have limited computing power.
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